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Abstract
The concept of direct computation used by Statman (1977) was instrumental in the development of a notion
of normal form for proofs of equality. In order to ﬁnd a functional (Curry–Howard style) interpretation of
direct computations we take a closer look at proof procedures for ﬁrst-order sentences with equality drawing
the attention to the need for introducing (function) symbols for rewrites. This leads us to a proposal to the
eﬀect that the framework of labelled natural deduction gives the right tools to formulate a proof theory for
the “logical connective” of propositional equality in the style of the so-called Curry–Howard interpretation.
The basic idea is that when analysing an equality sentence into (i) proof conditions (introduction) and (ii)
immediate consequences (elimination), it becomes clear that we need to bring in identiﬁers (i.e. function
symbols) for sequences of rewrites, and this is what we claim is the missing entity in P. Martin-Lo¨f’s equality
types (both intensional and extensional). For the proof system for equality we establish a normalisation
procedure, proving that it is terminating and conﬂuent. a
a Part of this material was presented in June 2006 at the Logical Methods in the Humanities Seminar ,
Stanford University, and the authors would like to thank Solomon Feferman and Grigori Mints for their
comments and suggestions. The main results were produced while the ﬁrst author was Edward Larocque
Tinker Visiting Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Stanford Univ, and the second author was a
Visiting Scholar at CSLI, Stanford.
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1 Introduction
The clariﬁcation of the notion of normal form for equality reasoning took an impor-
tant step with the work of Statman in the late 1970’s [35,36]. The concept of direct
computation was instrumental in the development of Statman’s approach. By way
of motivation, let us take a simple example from the λ-calculus.
(λx.(λy.yx)(λw.zw))v η (λx.(λy.yx)z)v β (λy.yv)z β zv
(λx.(λy.yx)(λw.zw))v β (λx.(λw.zw)x)v η (λx.zx)v β zv
(λx.(λy.yx)(λw.zw))v β (λx.(λw.zw)x)v β (λw.zw)v η zv
There is at least one sequence of conversions from the initial term to the ﬁnal term.
(In this case we have given three!) Thus, in the formal theory of λ-calculus, the
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term (λx.(λy.yx)(λw.zw))v is declared to be equal to zv.
Now, some natural questions arise:
(i) Are the sequences themselves normal?
(ii) Are there non-normal sequences?
(iii) If yes, how are the latter to be identiﬁed and (possibly) normalized?
(iv) What happens if general rules of equality are involved?
Of course, if one considers only the β-contractions, the traditional choice is for
the so-called leftmost reduction [8].
Nevertheless, we are interested in an approach to these questions that would be
applicable both to λ-calculus and to proofs in Gentzen’s style Natural Deduction.
As rightly pointed out by Le Chenadec in [5], the notion of normal proof has been
somewhat neglected by the systems of equational logic: “In proof-theory, since the
original work of Gentzen (1969) on sequent calculus, much work has been devoted
to the normalization process of various logics, Prawitz (1965), Girard (1988). Such
an analysis was lacking in equational logic (the only exceptions we are aware of
are Statman (1977), Kreisel and Tait (1961)).” The works of Statman [35,36] and
Le Chenadec [5] represent signiﬁcant attempts to ﬁll this gap. Statman studies proof
transformations for the equational calculus E of Kreisel–Tait [11]. Le Chenadec
deﬁnes an equational proof system (the LE system) and gives a normalization pro-
cedure.
What is a proof of an equality statement?
The so-called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov Interpretation deﬁnes logical con-
nectives by taking proof, rather than truth-values, as a primitive notion:
a proof of the proposition: is given by:
A ∧B a proof of A and a proof of B
A ∨B a proof of A or a proof of B
A → B a function that turns a proof of A into a
proof of B
∀xD.P (x) a function that turns an element a into a
proof of P (a)
∃xD.P (x) an element a (witness) and a proof of P (a)
Based on the Curry-Howard functional interpretation of logical connectives, one can
formulate the BHK-interpretation in formal terms as following:
a proof of the proposition: has the canonical form of:
A ∧B 〈p, q〉 where p is a proof of A and q is
a proof of B
A ∨B inl(p) where p is a proof of A or inr(q) where
q is a proof of B
(‘inl’ and ‘inr’ abbreviate ‘into the left/right
R.J.G.B. de Queiroz, A.G. de Oliveira / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 269 (2011) 19–4020
disjunct’)
A → B λx.b(x) where b(p) is a proof of B
provided p is a proof of A
∀xD.P (x) Λx.f(x) where f(a) is a proof of P (a)
provided a is an arbitrary individual chosen
from the domain D
∃xD.P (x) εx.(f(x), a) where a is a witness
from the domain D, f(a) is a proof of P (a)
(The term ‘εx.(f(x), a)’ is framed so as to formalise the notion of a function carrying
its own argument [30].)
A question remains, however:
What is a proof of an equality statement?
An answer to such a question will help us extend the BHK-interpretation with an
explanation of what is a proof of an equality statement:
a proof of the proposition: is given by:
t1 = t2 ?
(Perhaps a sequence of rewrites
starting from t1 and ending in t2?)
Two related questions naturally arise:
(i) What is the logical status of the symbol “=”?
(ii) What would be a canonical/direct proof of t1 = t2?
In a previous work [34] we have tried to show how the framework of labelled
natural deduction can help us formulate a proof theory for the “logical connective”
of propositional equality. 1 The connective is meant to be used in reasoning about
equality between referents (i.e. the objects of the functional calculus), as well as
with a general notion of substitution which is needed for the characterization of the
so-called term declaration logics [2].
In order to account for the distinction between the equalities that are:
deﬁnitional , i.e. those equalities that are given as rewrite rules (equations),
orelse originate from general functional principles (e.g. β, η, etc.),
and those that are:
propositional , i.e. the equalities that are supported (or otherwise) by an evi-
dence (a composition of rewrites),
1 An old question is in order here: what is a logical connective? We shall take it that from the point of view
of proof theory (natural deduction style) a logical connective is whatever logical symbol which is analysable
into rules of introduction and elimination.
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we need to provide for an equality sign as a symbol for rewrite (i.e. as part of the
functional calculus on the labels), and an equality sign as a symbol for a relation
between referents (i.e. as part of the logical calculus on the formulas).
Deﬁnitional equalities.
Let us recall from the theory of λ-calculus, that:
Deﬁnition 1.1 [[8], (Def. 6.2 and Notation 7.1)] The formal theory of λβη equality
has the following axioms:
(α) λx.M = λy.[y/x]M (y /∈ FV (M))
(β) (λx.M)N = [N/x]M
(η) (λx.Mx) = M (x /∈ FV (M))
(ρ) M = M
and the following inference rules:
(μ)
M = M ′
NM = NM ′
(τ)
M = N N = P
M = P
(ν)
M = M ′
MN = M ′N
(σ)
M = N
N = M
(ξ)
M = M ′
λx.M = λx.M ′
(ζ)
Mx = Nx
M = N
if x /∈ FV (MN)
Propositional equality.
Again, let us recall from the theory of λ-calculus, that:
Deﬁnition 1.37 (β-equality) [8]
We say that P is β-equal or β-convertible to Q (notation P =β Q) iﬀ Q can be
obtained from P by a ﬁnite (perhaps empty) series of β-contractions and reversed
β-contractions and changes of bound variables. That is, P =β Q iﬀ there exist
P0, . . . , Pn (n ≥ 0) such that
(∀i ≥ n− 1)(Pi 1β Pi+1 or Pi+1 1β Pi or Pi ≡α Pi+1).
P0 ≡ P, Pn ≡ Q.
NB: equality with an existential force.
The same happens with λβη-equality:
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Deﬁnition 7.5 (λβη-equality) [8]
The equality-relation determined by the theory λβη is called =βη; that is, we
deﬁne
M =βη N ⇔ λβη  M = N.
Note again that two terms are λβη-equal if there exists a proof of their equality
in the theory of λβη-equality.
Remark 1.2 In setting up a set of Gentzen’s ND-style rules for equality we need
to account for:
1. deﬁnitional versus propositional equality;
2. there may be more than one normal proof of a certain equality statement;
3. given a (possibly non-normal) proof, the process of bringing it to a normal form
should be ﬁnite and conﬂuent.
The missing entity.
Within the framework of the functional interpretation (a` la Curry–Howard [10]),
the deﬁnitional equality is often considered by reference to a judgement of the form:
a = b : D
which says that a and b are equal elements from domain D. Notice that the ‘reason’
why they are equal does not play any part in the judgement. This aspect of ‘forget-
ting contextual information’ is, one might say, the ﬁrst step towards ‘extensionality’
of equality, for whenever one wants to introduce intensionality into a logical sys-
tem one invariably needs to introduce information of a ‘contextual’ nature, such as,
where the identiﬁcation of two terms (i.e. equation) comes from.
We feel that a ﬁrst step towards ﬁnding an alternative formulation of the proof
theory for propositional equality which takes care of the intensional aspect is to
allow the ‘reason’ for the equality to play a more signiﬁcant part in the form of
judgement. We also believe that from the point of view of the logical calculus,
if there is a ‘reason’ for two expressions to be considered equal, the proposition
asserting their equality will be true, regardless of what particular composition of
rewrites (deﬁnitional equalities) amounts to the evidence in support of the proposi-
tion concerned. Given these general guidelines, we shall provide what may be seen
as a middle ground solution between the intensional [13,12] and the extensional [14]
accounts of Martin-Lo¨f’s propositional equality. The intensionality is taken care
by the functional calculus on the labels, while the extensionality is catered by the
logical calculus on the formulas. In order to account for the intensionality in the
labels, we shall make the composition of rewrites (deﬁnitional equalities) appear as
indexes of the equality sign in the judgement with a variable denoting a sequence of
equality identiﬁers (we have seen that in the Curry–Howard functional interpreta-
tion there are at least four ‘natural’ equality identiﬁers: β, η, ξ and μ). So, instead
of the form above, we shall have the following pattern for the equality judgement:
a =s b : D
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where ‘s’ is meant to be a sequence of equality identiﬁers.
In the sequel we shall be discussing in some detail the need to identify the kind of
deﬁnitional equality, as well as the need to have a logical connective of ‘propositional
equality’ in order to be able to reason about the functional objects (those to the
left hand side of the ‘:’ sign).
Term rewriting.
Deductive systems based on the Curry–Howard isomorphism [10] have an inter-
esting feature: normalization and strong normalization (Church–Rosser property)
theorems can be proved by reductions on the terms of the functional calculus. Ex-
ploring this important characteristic, we have proved these theorems for the Labelled
Natural Deduction – LND [32,33] via a term rewriting system constructed from the
LND-terms of the functional calculus [19]. Applying this same technique to the
LND equational fragment, we obtain the normalization theorems for the equational
logic of the Labelled Natural Deduction System [18,20,21].
This technique is used given the possibility of deﬁning two measures of redun-
dancy for the LND system that can be dealt with in the object level: the terms on
the functional calculus and the rewrite reason (composition of rewrites), the latter
being indexes of the equations in the LND equational fragment.
In the LND equational logic [29], the equations have the following pattern:
a =s b : D
where one is to read: a is equal to b because of ‘s’ (‘s’ being the rewrite reason); ‘s’
is a term denoting a sequence of equality identiﬁers (β, η, α, etc.), i.e. a composition
of rewrites. In other words, ‘s’ is the computational path from a to b.
In this way, the rewrite reason (reason, for short) represents an orthogonal
measure of redundancy for the LND , which makes the LND equational fragment
an “enriched” system of equational logic. Unlike the traditional equational logic
systems, in LND equational fragment there is a gain in local control by the use of
reason. All the proof steps are recorded in the composition of rewrites (reasons).
Thus, consulting the reasons, one should be able to see whether the proof has the
normal form. We have then used this powerful mechanism of controlling proofs to
present a precise normalization procedure for the LND equational fragment. Since
the reasons can be dealt with in the object level, we can employ a computational
method to prove the normalization theorems: we built a term rewriting system
based on an algebraic calculus on the “rewrite reasons”, which compute normal
proofs. With this we believe we are making a step towards ﬁlling a gap in the
literature on equational logic and on proof theory (natural deduction).
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Kreisel–Tait’s system.
In [11] Kreisel and Tait deﬁne the system E for equality reasoning as consisting
of axioms of the form t = t, and the following rules of inference:
(E1)
E[t/x] t = u
E[u/x]
(E2)
s(t) = s(u)
t = u
(E3)
0 = s(t)
A
for any formula A
(E4n)
t = sn(t)
A
for any formula A
where t and u are terms, ‘0’ is the ﬁrst natural number (zero), ‘s(-)’ is the successor
function.
Statman’s normal form theorem.
In order to prove the normalization results for the calculus E Statman deﬁnes
two subsets of E: (i) a natural deduction based calculus for equality reasoning NE;
(ii) a sequent style calculus SE.
The NE calculus is deﬁned as having axioms of the form a = a, and the rule of
substituting equals for equals:
(=)
E[a/u] a ≈ b
E[b/u]
where E is any set of equations, and a ≈ b is ambiguously a = b and b = a.
Statman arrives at various important results on normal forms and bounds for
proof search in NE. In this case, however, a rather diﬀerent notion of normal form
is being used: the ‘cuts’ do not arise out of an inversion principle, as it is the case for
the logical connectives, but rather from a certain form of sequence of equations which
Statman calls computation, and whose normal form is called direct computation.
With the formulation of a proof theory for the ‘logical connective’ of propositional
equality we wish to analyse equality reasoning into its basic components: rewrites,
on the one hand, and statements about the existence of rewrites, on the other hand.
This type of analysis came to the surface in the context of constructive type theory
and the Curry–Howard functional interpretation.
Martin-Lo¨f ’s Equality type.
There has been essentially two approaches to the problem of characterizing a
proof theory for propositional equality, both of which originate in P. Martin-Lo¨f’s
work on Intuitionistic Type Theory : the intensional [13] and the extensional [14]
formulations.
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The extensional version.
In his [14] and [15] presentations of Intuitionistic Type Theory P. Martin-Lo¨f
deﬁnes the type of extensional propositional equality ‘I’ (here called ‘Iext’) as:
Iext-formation
D type a : D b : D
Iext(D, a, b) type
Iext-introduction
a = b : D
r : Iext(D, a, b)
Iext-elimination
2
c : Iext(D, a, b)
a = b : D
Iext-equality
c : Iext(D, a, b)
c = r : Iext(D, a, b)
Note that the above account of propositional equality does not ‘keep track of all
proof steps’: both in the Iext-introduction and in the Iext-elimination rules there
is a considerable loss of information concerning the deduction steps. While in the
Iext-introduction rule the ‘a’ and the ‘b’ do not appear in the ‘trace’ (the label/term
alongside the logical formula), the latter containing only the canonical element ‘r’,
in the rule of Iext-elimination all the trace that might be recorded in the label ‘c’
simply disappears from label of the conclusion. If by ‘intensionality’ we understand
a feature of a logical system which identiﬁes as paramount the concern with issues
of context and provability , then it is quite clear that any logical system containing
Iext-type can hardly be said to be ‘intensional’: as we have said above, neither its
introduction rule nor its elimination rule carry the necessary contextual information
from the premise to the conclusion.
And, indeed, the well-known statement of the extensionality of functions can be
proved as a theorem of a logical system containing the Iext-type such as Martin-
Lo¨f’s Intuitionistic Type Theory [15]. The statement says that if two functions
return the same value in their common codomain when applied to each argument
of their common domain (i.e. if they are equal pointwise), then they are said to be
(extensionally) equal. Now, we can construct a derivation of the statement written
in the formal language as:
∀f, gA→B.(∀xA.Iext(B, APP(f, x), APP(g, x)) → Iext(A → B, f, g))
by using the rules of proof given for the Iext, assuming we have the rules of proof
given for the implication and the universal quantiﬁer.
2 The set of rules given in [14] contained the additional elimination rule:
c : I(D, a, b) d : C(r/z)
J(c, d) : C(c/z)
which may be seen as reminiscent of the previous intensional account of propositional equality [13].
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The intensional version.
Another version of the propositional equality, which has its origins in Martin-
Lo¨f’s early accounts of Intuitionistic Type Theory [12,13], and is apparently in the
most recent, as yet unpublished, versions of type theory, is deﬁned in [37] and [17].
In a section dedicated to the intensional vs. extensional debate, [37] (p.633) says
that:
“Martin-Lo¨f has returned to an intensional point of view, as in Martin-Lo¨f (1975),
that is to say, t = t′ ∈ A is understood as “t and t′ are deﬁnitionally equal”. As
a consequence the rules for identity types have to be adapted.”
If we try to combine the existing accounts of the intensional equality type ‘I’
[13,37,17], here denoted ‘Iint’, the rules will look like:
Iint-formation
D type a : D b : D
Iint(D, a, b) type
Iint-introduction
a : D
e(a) : Iint(D, a, a)
a = b : D
e(a) : Iint(D, a, b)
Iint-elimination
a : D b : D c : Iint(D, a, b)
[x:D]
d(x):C(x,x,e(x))
[x:D,y:D,z:Iint(D,x,y)]
C(x,y,z) type
J(c,d):C(a,b,c)
Iint-equality
a : D
[x : D]
d(x) : C(x, x, e(x))
[x : D, y : D, z : Iint(D,x, y)]
C(x, y, z) type
J(e(a), d(x)) = d(a/x) : C(a, a, e(a))
With slight diﬀerences in notation, the ‘adapted’ rules for identity type given
in [37] and [17] resembles the one given in [13]. It is called intensional equality
because there remains no direct connection between judgements like ‘a = b : D’ and
‘s : Iint(D, a, b)’.
A labelled proof theory for propositional equality.
Now, it seems that an alternative formulation of propositional equality within the
functional interpretation, which will be a little more elaborate than the extensional
Iext-type, and simpler than the intensional Iint-type, could prove more convenient
from the point of view of the ‘logical interpretation’. It seems that whereas in the
former we have a considerable loss of information in the Iext-elimination, in the
latter we have an Iint-elimination too heavily loaded with (perhaps unnecessary)
information. If, on the one hand, there is an overexplicitation of information in
Iint, on the other hand, in Iext we have a case of underexplicitation. With the
formulation of a proof theory for equality via labelled natural deduction we wish to
ﬁnd a middle ground solution between those two extremes.
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2 Labelled deduction
The functional interpretation of logical connectives via deductive systems which
use some sort of labelling mechanism [15,6,7] can be seen as the basis for a general
framework characterizing logics via a clear separation between a functional calculus
on the labels , i.e. the referents (names of individuals, expressions denoting the record
of proof steps used to arrive at a certain formula, names of ‘worlds’, etc.) and a
logical calculus on the formulas. The key idea is to make these two dimensions as
harmonious as possible, i.e. that the functional calculus on the labels matches the
logical calculus on the formulas at least in the sense that to every abstraction on the
variables of the functional calculus there corresponds a discharge of an assumption-
formula of the logical calculus. One aspect of such interpretation which stirred much
discussion in the literature of the past ten years or so, especially in connection
with Intuitionistic Type Theory [15], was that of whether the logical connective
of propositional equality ought to be dealt with ‘extensionally’ or ‘intensionally’.
Here we attempt to formulate what appears to be a middle ground solution, in
the sense that the intensional aspect is dealt with in the functional calculus on the
labels, whereas the extensionality is kept to the logical calculus. We also intend
to demonstrate that the connective of propositional equality (cf. Aczel’s [1] ‘
.
=’)
needs to be dealt with in a similar manner to ‘Skolem-type’ connectives (such as
disjunction and existential quantiﬁcation), where notions like hiding , choice and
dependent variables play crucial roˆles.
2.1 Identiﬁers for (compositions of) equalities
In the functional interpretation, where a functional calculus on the labels go hand
in hand with a logical calculus on the formulas, we have a classiﬁcation of equalities,
whose identiﬁcations are carried along as part of the deduction: either β-, η-, ξ-, μ-
or α- equality will have been part of an expression labelling a formula containing ‘
.
=’.
There one ﬁnds the key to the idea of ‘hiding’ in the introduction rule, and opening
local (Skolem-type) assumptions in the elimination rule. (Recall that in the case of
disjunction we also have alternatives: either into the left disjunct, or into the right
disjunct.) So, we believe that it is not unreasonable to start oﬀ the formalization of
propositional equality with the parallel to the disjunction and existential cases in
mind. Only, the witness of the type of propositional equality are not the ‘a’s and
‘b’s of ‘a = b : D’, but the actual (sequence of) equalities (β-, η-, ξ-, α-) that might
have been used to arrive at the judgement ‘a =s b : D’ (meaning ‘a = b’ because of
‘s’), ‘s’ being a sequence made up of β-, η-, ξ- and/or α-equalities, perhaps with
some of the general equality rules of reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity. So, in
the introduction rule of the type we need to form the canonical proof as if we were
hiding the actual sequence. Also, in the rule of elimination we need to open a
new local assumption introducing a new variable denoting a possible sequence as a
(Skolem-type) new constant. That is, in order to eliminate the connective ‘
.
=’ (i.e.
to deduce something from a proposition like ‘
.
=D (a, b)’), we start by choosing a new
variable to denote the reason why the two terms are equal: ‘let t be an expression
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(sequence of equalities) justifying the equality between the terms’. If we then arrive
at an arbitrary formula ‘C’ labelled with an expression where the t still occurs
free, then we can conclude that the same C can be obtained from the
.
=-formula
regardless of the identity of the chosen t, meaning that the label alongside C in the
conclusion will have been abstracted from the free occurrences of t.
Observe that now we are still able to ‘keep track’ of all proof steps (which does
not happen with Martin-Lo¨f’s Iext-type) [14,15], and we have an easier formulation
(as compared with Martin-Lo¨f’s Iint-type) [13] of how to perform the elimination
step.
2.2 The proof rules
In formulating the propositional equality connective, which we shall identify by ‘
.
=’,
we shall keep the pattern of inference rules essentially the same as the one used for
the other logical connectives (as in, e.g. [30]), and we shall provide an alternative
presentation of propositional equality as follows:
.
=-introduction
a =s b : D
s(a, b) :
.
=D (a, b)
.
=-reduction
a =s b : D
s(a, b) :
.
=D (a, b)
.
= -intr
[a =t b : D]
d(t) : C
REWR(s(a, b), t´d(t)) : C
.
= -elim β
[a =s b : D]
d(s/t) : C
.
=-induction
e :
.
=D (a, b)
[a =t b : D]
t(a, b) :
.
=D (a, b)
.
= -intr
REWR(e, t´t(a, b)) :
.
=D (a, b)
.
= -elim η e :
.
=D (a, b)
where ‘´ ’ is an abstractor which binds the occurrences of the (new) variable ‘t’
introduced with the local assumption ‘[a =t b : D]’ as a kind of ‘Skolem’-type
constant denoting the (presumed) ‘reason’ why ‘a’ was assumed to be equal to ‘b’.
(Recall the Skolem-type procedures of introducing new local assumptions in order
to allow for the elimination of logical connectives where the notion of ‘hiding’ is
crucial, e.g. disjunction and existential quantiﬁer – in [30].)
Now, having been deﬁned as a ‘Skolem’-type connective, ‘
.
=’ needs to have a
conversion stating the non-interference of the newly opened branch (the local as-
sumption in the
.
=-elimination rule) with the main branch. Thus, we have:
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.
=-(permutative) reduction
e :
.
=D (a, b)
[a =t b : D]
d(t) : C
REWR(e, t´d(t)) : C
w(REWR(e, t´d(t))) : W
r ζ
e :
.
=D (a, b)
[a =t b : D]
d(t) : C
w(d(t)) : W
r
REWR(e, t´w(d(t))) : W
provided w does not disturb the existing dependencies in the term e (the main
branch), i.e. provided that rule ‘r’ does not discharge any assumption on which
‘
.
=D (a, b)’ depends. The corresponding ζ-equality is:
w(REWR(e, t´d(t))) =ζ REWR(e, t´w(d(t)))
The equality indicates that the operation w can be pushed inside the -´abstraction
term, provided that it does not aﬀect the dependencies of the term e.
Since we are deﬁning the logical connective ‘
.
=’ as a connective which deals with
singular terms, where the ‘witness’ is supposed to be hidden, we shall not be using
direct elimination like Martin-Lo¨f’s Iext-elimination. Instead, we shall be using the
following
.
=-elimination:
e :
.
=D (a, b)
[a =t b : D]
d(t) : C
REWR(e, t´d(t)) : C
The elimination rule involves the introduction of a new local assumption (and cor-
responding variable in the functional calculus), namely ‘[a =t b : D]’ (where ‘t’ is
the new variable) which is only discharged (and ‘t’ bound) in the conclusion of the
rule. The intuitive explanation would be given in the following lines. In order to
eliminate the equality
.
=-connective, where one does not have access to the ‘reason’
(i.e. a sequence of ‘β’, ‘η’, ‘ξ’ or ‘ζ’ equalities) why the equality holds because ‘
.
=’
is supposed to be a connective dealing with singular terms (as are ‘∨’ and ‘∃’), in
the ﬁrst step one has to open a new local assumption supposing the equality holds
because of, say ‘t’ (a new variable). The new assumption then stands for ‘let t be
the unknown equality’. If a third (arbitrary) statement can be obtained from this
new local assumption via an unspeciﬁed number of steps which does not involve
any binding of the new variable ‘t’, then one discharges the newly introduced local
assumption binding the free occurrences of the new variable in the label alongside
the statement obtained, and concludes that that statement is to be labelled by the
term ‘REWR(e, t´d(t))’ where the new variable (i.e. t) is bound by the ‘´ ’-abstractor.
Another feature of the
.
=-connective which is worth noticing at this stage is
the equality under ‘ξ’ of all its elements (see second introduction rule). This does
not mean that the labels serving as evidences for the
.
=-statement are all identical
to a constant (cf. constant ‘r’ in Martin-Lo¨f’s Iext-type), but simply that if two
(sequences of) equality are obtained as witnesses of the equality between, say ‘a’
and ‘b’ of domain D, then they are taken to be equal under ξ-equality. It would
not seem unreasonable to think of the
.
=-connective of propositional equality as
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expressing the proposition which, whenever true, indicates that the two elements of
the domain concerned are equal under some (unspeciﬁed, hidden) composition of
deﬁnitional equalities. It is as if the proposition points to the existence of a term
(witness) which depends on both elements and on the kind of equality judgements
used to arrive at its proof. So, in the logical side, one forgets about what was the
actual witness. Cf. the existential generalization:
F (t)
∃x.F (x)
where the actual witness is in fact ‘abandoned’. Obviously, as we are interested
in keeping track of relevant information introduced by each proof step, in labelled
natural deduction system the witness is not abandoned, but is carried over as an
unbounded name in the label of the corresponding conclusion formula.
t : D f(t) : F (t)
εx.(f(x), t) : ∃xD.F (x)
Note, however, that it is carried along only in the functional side, the logical side
not keeping any trace of it at all.
Now, notice that if the functional calculus on the labels is to match the logical
calculus on the formulas, than we must have the resulting label on the left of the
‘β ’ as β-convertible to the concluding label on the right. So, we must have the
convertibility equality:
REWR(s(a, b), t´d(t)) =β d(s/t) : C
The same holds for the η-equality:
REWR(e, t´t(a, b)) =η e :
.
=D (a, b)
Parallel to the case of disjunction, where two diﬀerent constructors distinguish
the two alternatives, namely ‘inl’ and ‘inr’, we here have any (sequence of) equality
identiﬁers (‘β’, ‘η’, ‘μ’, ‘ξ’, etc.) as constructors of proofs for the
.
=-connective.
They are meant to denote the alternatives available.
General rules of equality.
Apart from the already mentioned ‘constants’ (identiﬁers) which compose the
reasons for equality (i.e. the indexes to the equality on the functional calculus), it
is reasonable to expect that the following rules are taken for granted: reﬂexivity ,
symmetry and transitivity .
Substitution without involving quantiﬁers.
We know from logic programming, i.e. from the theory of uniﬁcation, that sub-
stitution can take place even when no quantiﬁer is involved. This is justiﬁed when,
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for some reason a certain referent can replace another under some condition for
identifying the one with the other.
Now, what would be counterpart to such a ‘quantiﬁer-less’ notion of substitution
in a labelled natural deduction system. Without the appropriate means of handling
equality (deﬁnitional and propositional) we would hardly be capable of ﬁnding such
a counterpart. Having said all that, let us think of what we ought to do at a certain
stage in a proof (deduction) where the following two premises would be at hand:
a =g y : D and f(a) : P (a)
We have that a and y are equal (‘identiﬁable’) under some arbitrary sequence of
equalities (rewrites) which we name g. We also have that the predicate formula
P (a) is labelled by a certain functional expression f which depends on a. Clearly,
if a and y are ‘identiﬁable’, we would like to infer that P , being true of a, will
also be true of y. So, we shall be happy in inferring (on the logical calculus) the
formula P (y). Now, given that we ought to compose the label of the conclusion
out of a composition of the labels of the premises, what label should we insert
alongside P (y)? Perhaps various good answers could be given here, but we shall
choose one which is in line with our ‘keeping record of what (relevant) data was used
in a deduction’. We have already stated how much importance we attach to names
of individuals, names of formula instances, and of course, what kind of deduction
was performed (i.e. what kind of connective was introduced or eliminated). In
this section we have also insisted on the importance of, not only ‘classifying’ the
equalities, but also having variables for the kinds of equalities that may be used in
a deduction. Let us then formulate our rule of ‘quantiﬁer-less’ substitution as:
a =g y : D f(a) : P (a)
g(a, y) · f(a) : P (y)
which could be explained in words as follows: if a and y are ‘identiﬁable’ due to a
certain g, and f(a) is the evidence for P (a), then let the composition of g(a, y) (the
label for the propositional equality between a and y) with f(a) (the evidence for
P (a)) be the evidence for P (y).
By having this extra rule of substitution added to the system of rules of inference,
we are able to validate one half of the so-called ‘Leibniz’s law’, namely:
∀xD∀yD.( .=D (x, y) → (P (x) → P (y)))
The LND equational fragment.
As we already mentioned, in the LND equational logic, the equations have an
index (the reason) which keeps all proof steps. The reasons is deﬁned by the kind
of rule used in the proof and the equational axioms (deﬁnitional equalities) of the
system. The rules are divided into the following classes: (i) general rules; (ii)
subterm substitution rule; (iii) ξ- and μ-rules.
Since the LND system is based on the Curry–Howard isomorphism [10], terms
represent proof constructions, thus proof transformations correspond to equalities
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between terms. In this way, the LND equational logic can deal with equalities
between LND proofs. The proofs in the LND equational fragment which deals with
equalities between deductions are built from the basic proof transformations for
the LND system, given in [32,30,33]. These basic proof transformations form an
equational system, composed by deﬁnitional equalities (β, η and ζ).
General rules.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (equation) An equation in LNDEQ is of the form:
s =r t : D
where s and t are terms, r is the identiﬁer for the rewrite reason, and D is the type
(formula).
Deﬁnition 2.2 (system of equations) A system of equations S is a set of equa-
tions:
{s1 =r1 t1 : D1, . . . , sn =rn tn : Dn}
where ri is the rewrite reason identiﬁer for the ith equation in S.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (rewrite reason) Given a system of equations S and an equation
s =r t : D, if S  s =r t : D, i.e. there is a deduction/computation of the equation
starting from the equations in S, then the rewrite reason r is built up from:
(i) the constants for rewrite reasons: { ρ, β, η, ζ };
(ii) the ri’s;
using the substitution operations:
(iii) subL;
(iv) subR;
and the operations for building new rewrite reasons:
(v) σ, τ , ξ, μ.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (general rules of equality) The general rules for equality (re-
ﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity) are deﬁned as follows:
reﬂexivity symmetry transitivity
x : D
x =ρ x : D
x =t y : D
y =σ(t) x : D
x =t y : D y =u z : D
x =τ(t,u) z : D
The “subterm substitution” rule.
Equational logic as usually presented has the following inference rule of substi-
tution:
s = t
sθ = tθ
where θ is a substitution.
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Note that the substitution θ “appeared” in the conclusion of the rule. As rightly
pointed out by Le Chenadec in [5], from the view point of the subformula property
(objects in the conclusion of some inference should be subobjects of the premises),
this rule is unsatisfactory. He then deﬁnes two rules:
IL
M = N C[N ] = O
C[M ] = O
IR
M = C[N ] N = O
M = C[O]
where M , N and O are terms and the context C[ ] is adopted in order to distinguish
subterms.
In [19] we have formulated an inference rule called “subterm substitution” which
deals in a explicit way 3 with substitutions. In fact, the LND [32,33] can be seen
as an enriched system which brings to the object language terms, and now substi-
tutions.
Deﬁnition 2.5 (subterm substitution) The rule of “subterm substitution” is
framed as follows:
x =r C | y |: D y =s u : D′
x =subL(r,s) C | u |: D
x =r w : D
′ C | w |=s u : D
C | x |=subR(r,s) u : D
where C is the context in which the subterm detached by ‘| |’ appears and D′ could
be a subdomain of D, equal to D or disjoint to D.
The symbols subL and subR denote in which side (L – left or R – right) is the
premiss that contains the subterm to be substituted.
Note that the transitivity rule previously deﬁned can be seen as a special case
for this rule when D′ = D and the context C is empty.
3 In [32] de Queiroz and Gabbay recall Girard, who describes the intimate connections between construc-
tivity and explicitation, and claim that “...one of the aims of inserting a label alongside formulas (accounting
for the steps made to arrive at each particular point in the deduction) is exactly that of making explicit the
use of formulas (and instances of formulas and individuals) throughout a deduction ...”
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The ξ- and μ-rules.
In the Curry–Howard “formulae-as-types” interpretation [10], the ξ-rule 4 states
when two canonical elements are equal, and the μ-rule 5 states when two non-
canonical elements are equal. So, each introduction rule for the LND system has
associated to it a ξ-rule and each elimination rule has a related μ-rule. For instance,
the ξ-rule and μ-rule for the connective ∧ are deﬁned as follows:
x =u y : A s =v t : B
〈x, s〉 =ξ(u,v) 〈y, t〉 : A ∧B
x =r y : A ∧B
FST(x) =μ(r) FST(y) : A
x =r y : A ∧B
SND(x) =μ(r) SND(y) : B
Term rewriting system for LND with equality.
In [20] we have proved termination and conﬂuence for the rewriting system
arising out of the proof rules given for the proposed natural deduction system for
equality.
The idea is to analyse all possible occurrences of redundancies in proofs which
involve the rules of rewriting, and the most obvious case is the nested application
of the rule of symmetry. But there are a number of cases when the application of
rewriting rules is redundant, but which is not immediately obvious that there is a
redundancy. Take, for instance, the following case:
Deﬁnition 2.6 [reductions involving τ ]
x =r y : D y =σ(r) x : D
x =τ(r,σ(r)) x : D
 x =ρ x : D
y =σ(r) x : D x =r y : D
y =τ(σ(r),r) y : D
 y =ρ y : D
u =r v : D v =ρ v : D
u =τ(r,ρ) v : D
 u =r v : D
4 The ξ-rule is the formal counterpart to Bishop’s constructive principle of deﬁnition of a set [4] (page 2)
which says: “To deﬁne a set we prescribe, at least implicitly, what we have (the constructing intelligence)
must to do in order to construct an element of the set, and what we must do to show that two elements
of the set are equal.” Cf. also [4] (page 12) Bishop deﬁnes a product of set as “The cartesian product, or
simply product , X ≡ X1 × . . . ×Xn of sets X1, X2, . . . , Xn is deﬁned to be the set of all ordered n-tuples
(x1, . . . , xn) and (y1, . . . , yn) of X are equal if the coordinates xi and yi are equal for each i.” See also [15]
(p.8): “... a set A is deﬁned by prescribing how a canonical element of A is formed as well as how two equal
canonical elements of A are formed.” We also know from the theory of Lambda Calculus the deﬁnition of
ξ-rule, see e.g. [3] (pp. 23 and 78): “ξ : M = N ⇒ λx.M = λx.N”
5 The μ-rule is also deﬁned in the theory of Lambda Calculus, see e.g. [16]: “The equational axioms and
inference rules are as follows, where [N/x]M denotes substitution of N for x in M . . . .
(μ)
Γ M1 = M2 : σ ⇒ τ Γ  N1 = N2 : σ
Γ M1N1 = M2N2 : τ
”
and is divided into two equalities μ and ν in [8] (p.66):
(μ)
M = M ′
NM = NM ′
(ν)
M = M ′
MN = M ′N
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u =ρ u : D u =r v : D
u =τ(ρ,r) v : D
 u =r v : D
Associated rewriting rule over the reason:
τ(r, σ(r))  ρ
τ(σ(r), r)  ρ
τ(r, ρ)  r
τ(ρ, r)  r.
Below is another less obvious case of ocurrence of redundancy:
Deﬁnition 2.7 [βrewr-→-reduction]
a =s a′ : A
[x : A]
...
b(x) =r g(x) : B
λx.b(x) =ξ(r) λx.g(x) : A → B
→ -intr
APP(λx.b(x), a) =μ(s,ξ(r)) APP(λx.g(x), a′) : B
→ -elim
 b(a/x) =r g(a
′/x) : B
Associated rewriting rule:
μ(s, ξ(r))  r.
As an example:
Example 2.8
x =r y : A
inl(r) =ξ(r) inl(y) : A ∨B
x =r y : A
y =σ(r) x : A
inl(y) =ξ(σ(r)) inl(x) : A ∨B
inl(x) =τ(ξ(r),ξ(σ(r))) inl(x) : A ∨B

x : A
x =ρ x : A
inl(x) =ξ(ρ) inl(x) : A ∨B
Associated rewriting rule over the reason:
τ(ξ(r), ξ(σ(r)))  ξ(ρ).
By analysing all cases of redundant proofs in ﬁrst-order logic with equality we
arrive at following set of associated rewriting rules:
Deﬁnition 2.9 [LNDEQ-TRS]
1. σ(ρ)  ρ
2. σ(σ(r))  r
3. τ(C[r], C[σ(r)])  C[ρ]
4. τ(C[σ(r)], C[r])  C[ρ]
5. τ(C[r], C[ρ])  C[r]
6. τ(C[ρ], C[r])  C[r]
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7. subL(C[r], C[ρ])  C[r]
8. subR(C[ρ], C[r])  C[r]
9. subL(subL(s, C[r]), C[σ(r)])  s
10. subL(subL(s, C[σ(r)]), C[r])  s
11. subR(C[s], subR(C[σ(s)], r))  r
12. subR(C[σ(s)], subR(C[s], r))  r
13. (FST) μ(ξ(r, s))  r
14. (SND) μ(ξ(r, s))  s
15. (inl) μ(ξ(r), s, u)  s
16. (inr) μ(ξ(r), s, u)  u
17. (βrewr-{→, ∀}) μ(s, ξ(r))  r
18. (βrewr-∃) μ(ξ(r), s)  s
19. (ηrewr-∧) ξ(μ(r))  r
20. (ηrewr-∨) μ(t, ξ(r), ξ(s))  t
21. (ηrewr:{→, ∀}) ξ(μ(r, s))  s
22. (ηrewr-∃) μ(s, ξ(r))  s
23. σ(τ(r, s))  τ(σ(s), σ(r))
24. σ(subL(r, s))  subR(σ(s), σ(r))
25. σ(subR(r, s))  subL(σ(s), σ(r))
26. σ(ξ(r))  ξ(σ(r))
27. σ(ξ(s, r))  ξ(σ(s), σ(r))
28. σ(μ(r))  μ(σ(r))
29. σ(μ(s, r))  μ(σ(s), σ(r))
30. σ(μ(r, u, v))  μ(σ(r), σ(u), σ(v))
31. τ(r, subL(ρ, s))  subL(r, s)
32. τ(r, subR(s, ρ))  subL(r, s)
33. τ(subL(r, s), t)  τ(r, subR(s, t))
34. τ(subR(s, t), u)  subR(s, τ(t, u))
35. τ(τ(t, r), s)  τ(t, τ(r, s))
Theorem 2.10 (Termination property, [20]) LNDEQ-TRS is terminating.
Theorem 2.11 (Conﬂuence property, [20]) LNDEQ-TRS is conﬂuent.
3 Finale
The conception of the very ﬁrst decision procedures for ﬁrst-order sentences in the
1920’s brought about the need for giving ‘logical’ citizenship to function symbols
(e.g., Skolem functions). We have taken the view that a closer look at proof proce-
dures for ﬁrst-order sentences with equality brings about the need for introducing
what we have called the “missing entity”: (function) symbols for rewrites. This,
we have argued, is appropriately done via the framework of labelled natural de-
duction which allows to formulate a proof theory for the “logical connective” of
propositional equality. The basic idea is that when analysing an equality sentence
into (i) proof conditions (introduction) and (ii) immediate consequences (elimina-
tion), it becomes clear that we need to bring in identiﬁers (i.e. function symbols)
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for sequences of rewrites, and this is what we have claimed should be the missing
entity in P. Martin-Lo¨f’s equality types, both intensional and extensional. What
we end up with is a formulation of what appears to be a middle ground solution to
the ‘intensional’ vs. ‘extensional’ dichotomy which permeates most of the work on
characterising propositional equality in natural deduction style.
Uniqueness of equality proofs.
Although the rewriting system is terminating and conﬂuent, we have observed an
interesting phenomenon here: there may be more than a normal proof of an equality
statement. This is not a contradiction since the conﬂuence property only says that
the term for the equality reason can be brought to a unique normal form regardless
of the order in which it is reduced. But there may be a diﬀerent, yet normal, proof
of the same equality statement. What appears to be a similar phenomenon has been
identiﬁed in a paper by Hoﬀman and Streicher [9], which, although in a diﬀerent
context, indicates that there is a need to investigate further what is happening here.
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